Simplifying the Process
As we reason our way through a variety of examples, it might
appear that the process is too cumbersome to be put to practical use for
everyday problems. We don’t want to find ourselves in the position of
having to work at length through a life-or-death problem when we need an
immediate solution. As it turns out, the process can be vastly
simplified. However, simplifying any system without compromising its
benefits or creating problems requires preparation, practice, and enough
familiarity to appreciate and retain the advantages of the full system
in its streamlined version.
A rational ethic offers the flexibility to tailor a solution
to a particular problem. But after several passes through an initial
“set-up” stage of the ethic, we’ll have identified the most common
behaviors and classified them according to our core value. In essence,
we’ll have created a general list of dos and don’ts—much
like a traditional list of maxims or “commandments,” except that these
have been developed through methodical reasoning, not imposed by
authority. Our established list of responses then serves as a reliable
guide in ordinary situations. Such a list forms the basis of what’s
called a rule ethic, which affords us the convenience, in most
cases, of governing our behavior by pre-established standards. The
availability of the two forms of ethics—a fully reasoned act
ethic (which enables us to deal rationally with specific acts in
specific situations and with specific complications), and a general
rule ethic that applies in ordinary situations—constitutes what’s
commonly called a two-level ethic.1 But since we
already use the term level to identify the scope of our focus, it
would be less confusing for us to call the act-or-rule option a mode
instead; thus we have a two-mode (or bimodal) ethic
with multiple levels.
Well, then, why should we go out of our way to pursue the
more laborious method, if most of the time it produces results similar
to traditional morality? There are good reasons for investing the time
and effort to understand and practice the method.
First, we occasionally find that some idea in traditional
morality doesn’t make sense, that it’s irrelevant (or even
counterproductive) in the current environment, or inadequate to address
issues that have arisen in the modern era. For example, the dramatic
increase in life expectancy is grounds for many to rethink traditional
attitudes toward the permanence of marriage: A century or more ago, when
average life expectancy was little more than fifty years, it was
commonplace for married couples to spend thirty of those years in a
reasonably comfortable union. But is it realistic to expect an average
couple to live happily and harmoniously together for twice that span or
more? Some might make it, and they’re to be congratulated. But a great
many eventually encounter intolerable marital friction, a painful,
dividing experience rather than a comforting and uniting one; the
erstwhile partners become adversaries, and the relationship becomes a
perpetually escalating torment. There should be no stigma attached to
divorce if it permits people to escape dysfunctional unions and to find
more compatible mates. Our methodical approach enables us to weed out
or update anachronisms that we might otherwise overlook.
Second, life sometimes throws the unexpected at us.
Sometimes we’re confronted by unique situations that no moralist has
ever anticipated. Sometimes we must make decisions, not between a good
and a bad action, or even between the greater of two goods or the lesser
of two bads, but among a range of choices, each of which contains a
mixture of both good and bad. War to defeat slavery and genocide,
free-market economics, birth control, therapeutic abortion,
compassionate euthanasia, and stem cell remedies for diabetes and
Parkinson’s are but a few such issues—or opportunities—that have arisen
in modern times. Using evidence available at the time, we must
rationally assess which option (or combination of options) will most
likely yield the greatest good and the least harm overall. There are no
pat solutions to complex problems, but when they arise, we can use
rational ethics to address them. This is because a practical, working
understanding of the hows and whys of moral judgment is
central to rational ethics. Having cultivated and used this
understanding to set up the ethic, we can then use the same
understanding to resolve conflicts and to adapt to unexpected
situations, to take advantage of opportunities and to avoid unnecessary
risks. This ability to adapt contrasts starkly with traditionally rigid
Bronze-Age moralities which, relying as they do on authoritarian dogma
instead of evidence and reason, aren’t readily adaptable to a
post-slavery, post-monarchic space age of democracy, science, industry,
information, and global interaction.
Third, working through ethical problems at our leisure is
great practice. It accustoms our minds to thinking through problems
methodically and in terms of rationally established values, rather than
reacting impulsively. Familiarity with the method keeps us in tune with
the values and the objective, even when we’re forced to take shortcuts.
If pressed to make an urgent decision, practical experience makes us
habitually aware of things that are most important to consider, keeps us
alert to key factors that an inexperienced person might overlook, and
thus enables us to take these into account quickly, without the need to
dwell over them at length. Practice thus prepares us to apply the
experience of careful observation, evidence evaluation, and sound
thinking to on-the-spot resolution of problems that arise unexpectedly.
Even so, we must be prepared to act in an emergency when
necessary. Moreover, repetitive deliberation in routine situations
wastes time that could otherwise be more productively or enjoyably
spent. So, it’s also to our advantage to have a convenient set of
established rules at hand; and if these rules have been formulated
beforehand by methodical reason and verified by consistent experience,
so much the better. Indeed, through regular use of a rational act
ethic, one tends to develop a corresponding rule ethic more-or-less from
sheer habit. (Unfortunately, it doesn’t work the other way around.
Habitual use of rule ethics doesn’t give rise to rational act ethics;
unthinking habit is far more likely to degenerate into a static moral
code.) With all this in mind, it’s not only possible, but even
advisable, to employ a bimodal system of ethics, and to be able to
choose the act or rule mode as appropriate to the
situation at hand.
1 Two-level or bimodal ethics
have also been developed by 20th-century philosophers R.M.
Hare and Peter Singer.
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Testing the Theory